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ABSTRAC?
Therecent wave of corporate restructuring in the United
States has been accused of shortening the investment horizons of
U.S. managers. This paper surveys the empirical and case study
evidence on restructuring and investment behavior and reaches the
following conclusions 1) A large fraction of the restructurings
were motivated by synergistic or other efficiency-enhancing reasons
and have little to do with investment horizons. 2) However, massive
shifts toward debt in the capital structure of manufacturing firms.
often induced by hostile takeover threats, are accompanied by
reduced investment of all kinds, particularly in a few industries
which are characterized by "stable' technology and cost-based
innovative strategies. 3) The evidence is consistent with
optimizing behavior on the part of firms faced with a lower
relative price of debt to equity and a higher overall cost of
capital during the nineteen-eighties, but there all still doubts
about whether the U.S. market for corporate control elicits the
correct level of long run investment. Thus the paper concludes
with a discussion of the evidence on cross-country differences in
the financing of investment and the market for corporate control









CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING AND INVESTMENT HORIZONS
Bronvyn H. Hall
1. Introduction,
How are these two topics related? Corporate restructuring, whether
financial or otherwise, has been accused of shortening the investment
horizons of U.S. managers in the recent past. Put simply, the argument is
that takeovers or the fear of takeovers force managers to pay attention to
short-term earnings at the expense of long-term investments, and that this
bias increased during the wave of restrucrurings in the 1980s. Those making
this argument often point to the Japanese or German experience during the
same period as examples of market economies which have not experienced
substantial restructuring, and yet have apparently invested at a much higher
rate than the United States.
In spite of the prevalence and apparent plausibility of the view that
takeover threats induced by tha undervaluation or non-optimal utilization of
a firm's assets could lead to underinvestment in assets which have a longer
term payback period, it has proved difficult to find evidence that this is
the case in general. At the same time, restructurings do appear to have had
positive benefits in terms of short term productivity gains, profitability,
and "focus" (a movement away from diversification towards concentration on
the main line of business).1 This paper will probe the question in somewhat
1Cite to Porter (?).
1more detail,aurvcytng the available evident r te invastmont oonseo,uenors
ofrestruoturing cod oocparing the '3. S expei coretothatin severe: other
orintties,
Ibegin by considering the nature of o rprtorerestruotutirg: whet is
it, and how is it done? I rake the term tr octet a whole rangs of
activities, most of thea large discrete rvoctscharges in control
(including ownership changes), changes itfinancialstructure (tie balance
sheet), or changes in the major lfnes ef "usiness in which tie firm
operates, Many of these activities ocur a the sane time, since ti-ey ar
sometimes mote easily performed in trdem. For example, a change in
ownership may be accompanied by the s'-lltng off of lines of businea.; to
finance the purchase, or by the rerirr rent of equity and issuance of debt in
orderto restructure the balance sheet In fact, because of the
transactions costs associated with the change of control of a public
company, it is rare to find this event not accompanied by some other large
discrete change in the firm's stroc';rc since the need for small
adjustments in the firm's structure will not induce a control charge) -
However,these different motivations for restructuring have different
implications for investment horizons: feat of a control change and tOe
subsequent loss of job may cause managers to rave a shtrt-term focr, while
leveraging (changing the financial structurc ; say induce a decline it
investment simply because the cost of funds has riron, owing to the
reduction in free cash flow. A restructuring involving the divestiture of
old or the acquisition of new lines of business has no particular
implications for investment: it may incrrare, decrease, or redirect spendingon long-lived assets.2
For this reason, this paper focuses on the first two types of
restructuring: chsnges in financial structure, whether or not they are
accompanied by ownership changes. I divide these restructurings into two
basic types: I) substantial increases in leverage, either (a) accompanied
by a changc in control (e.g., leveraged buyouts, a majority of which are
also management buyouts, or going private transactions), or (b) with no
change of control (a substantial increase in the debt-equity ratio) 2)
takeovers not accompanied by a change in the financial structure of the
acquiring firm, whether friendly or hostile.
Defining what we mean by a shortened time horizon for investment is
somewhat trickier. Although is clear that the concept refers to the extent
to which longer term performance of the firm dominates over short term
considerations in the firm's decision making process, it is difficult to
make a mathematically precise definition which will satisfy all those who
have thought about the problem. Dne possible definition might make the time
horizon a simple function of the internal rate of return used by the firm in
evaluating projects. For example, f we ask over what horizon the firm
would be indifferent between $IDDD today and $1ODDD in the future, the answer
would be ID years if the requited rate of return were 2 percent per year
and 24 years if it were lD percent. Clearly these sets of numbers imply
quite different time frames over which the firm will look when evaluating
the payback of a particular investment and the weight which it will place on
2See Bhagat, Shleifer, and Vishny (l99D) and bichtenberg (l99D) for
evidence that acquisition and divestiture of lines of business during the
l9O5 was motivated to a great extent by the undoing of the conglomerate
wave of the iDa and 7Ds and was accompanied by productivity gains n the
core lines of business.short tens'lesst'afive yeats) sic lnc'-ten nnoaidetatiots.'-V- the
othe'-hand this dcimit' nnaybetto ritid when ccnf rontedwitl thewayin
whi -I. firma actually o ical budgeting b'because not a]I usc t a
rn-fred1kB Internal Data of Petutn aprr-nl. and because different rates
n' used for different rt'-'e'-ts.I'n-tunatn]I do ntt necessarily requite
a ttecise Cefinitren '-f the on-capt in order '-o examine the impli cation of
aborter time horn . t fn- inveatoant; it will be suffIcient to keep the
general relatoos ioetvaensb'-rhntitons, high discount rates and the
relativeimp'-rt-i'-r- of neat-tart as p'nedto fat-term fetters in mind
is!-- '-ow coo-ten posctiee t ninn-in that POD invastosnt has a
longer'-i-shorizont.an ordinaryir;en-nt,4 but this does requite some
)ustificmnion in the light of what a' row about th0 relative depreoiation
ratea of the two kinds of capital. 'lbs tate of economic depreciation of
ordinary capital is commonly thought 'n be in the range of 10-15 percent,
whilethat forR&Dcap5taliaapParery somewhat higher (Bakes and
l'hookerman 1984 andHalllgffbfind n-es 'f the order of 25 percent).
lila im lies that the time horimo— fPOt inveatment should actually be
•tIer than Cot ordinary investment.
I think the cxplanation for this — role lice in the intettemporal
nan-ta of the pt'-duction function for hr w]cdge capital: although it
an-eats that the returns to R&Daxpenditoteedeolnerather quickly,the
tn-etc expenditures are in fact tightly 1': cc
' those made several yaata
'SecBaldwinand Clark (this volume) for forthet discussion of capital
budgeting techniques end Poterba and Summcts ('iisv lose) for survey
evidence on firm daciaon makiog.
°SeeJattcll, hahn.and Hartln-5), Hall 'lOfia, 109Cc, endHuelhroek at
an-n-oanofwkom use P41 asa proxyfor long-teto investmer'-.
4earlier, and the true payhack period is much longer.5 This hypothesis is
supported by the evidence of apparently high adjustment costs and a slow
rate of change for R&D investment.6 In the absence of inrecnal evidence on
the actual planning horizons of managers, this paper will consider that the
behavior of R&D investment in particular, and investment in general, serve
as proxies for the changes in investment horizons of corporations.
Before leaving the topic of investment horizons, I note thac one form
of long-term investment on the part of firms, investment in the education
and skills of its workers, is not explicitly considered here, Df course,
this type of investment is closely linked to investments in new technology
and innovation, but it is possible that changes in ownership and the
accompanying changes in employment which are documented here discourage
at least some firma from making investments in the human capital of their
workers.7 That is, a firm which expects to be taken over or which dosizes
under the threat of takeover may also fail to invest in its workers. My
reading of the evidence in the debate over the winners and losers in
corporate restructuring suggests that some of the private gains from this
the production of capital from investment is additively separable, as
is usually assumed for ordinary investment, a high deprecation rate implies
a quick payback to investment, and vice versa. However, if the production
of knowledge capital from R&D investment is not additively separable, as
seems likely, it is possible to show that a depreciation rate which is
measured as high when a conventional perpetual inventory specification is
used j consistent with very slowly decaying rates of return to lagged R&D
expenditures.
6Bernstein and Hadiri (19)andHall, Hausman, and Griliches (1986).
7See Rochan and Oatermsn (this volume) for a fuller discussion of the
differences between U.S., Japanese, and German corporate practices with
respect to job tenure and firs-specific and firm-level training. Surely
part of the national institutional difference here can be accounted for by
the relatively more active market in corporate control in the United States,
which would reduce the incentives for nvestmenc, at least at the management
level.actr:ity may come at the expenaeofemployees of thefirms involved;8 even
rhcrewho donot 'iew empl'veesasbev:ngp'operty rightsin U e firm may he
:or erned if there is a lots of gpialjy y3jnable human napitalowingto the
cransaction.
2.TheEvidence on agf.tructuringIrveetm.
Therehae by now been quite a few studiee which document the results
of reatructurings which occorred during tho l970a and l9f0s. I focus my
attention on those which look at RAt invEarvent first. These studies are of
two types: large scale empirical atudica (Hall1988a,l990a, Lichtenberg
andSiegell990a,199db, andSmith 1981),andcase studies of afewlarge
firms undergoing restructuring or acquiaitrrn(Miller 1990s,1990h end
Fusfeld 1987).
I begin with my study (Hall 1990a) which is the most comprehensive on
the subject although limited in some dimonsions because it relies solely on
pullic data. The study is based on a complete universe of publicly traded
manufacturing firms (about 2500) from 1976 to 1987.I identified every exit
from this sample (about 1200) during the eleven year period and traced the
reason why the exit occurred. This icformation, together with changes in the
debt-equity ratio of surviving firms, is used to identify firms
experiencing the major restructuring events.
In Table 1, I show the overall statistics or these events during the
pariod. The eleven year totals of the significance of these transactions
(neas:red by employment) suggest that about 30 percent of all firma were
involved, or 3 percent per year. About half of this is merger or
8Ehagat, Shleifet, and Vshny (1990).acquisition between two public companies; only 9-11 percent is of the
leveraging variety, but the importance of the latter type of transaction
increases markedly during the later half of the period. In 1987, two
percent of the employees in publicly traded manufacturing firms were
employed by a firm which went private through an 120 or experienced a
substantial increase in leverage during the year. In my l990a study, I used
the sample of restructurings summarized in this table to investigate the
simple correlation between corporate restructuring and changes in R&D
intensity.
The major empirical findings of that paper were threefold: First, I
found that leveraged buyouts and other private acquisitions of publicly
traded manufacturing firms had taken place overwhelmingly in the sectors
where R&D investment and innovation have not been important, at least to the
industry as a whole. The industries and firms in question are those with
the steady cash flow necessary to service the debt, They are largely
smaller firms in the consumer nondurable industries (Food, Textiles, the
auto parts sector of the Motor Vehicle industry, the tire sector of the
Rubber and Plastics industry, and Miscellaneous Manufacturing) or those
which have been downsizing for some time under pressure from foreign
competition and reduced innovative opportunities (Textiles again, Fabricated
Metals, and Stone, Clay, and Class). Together these two groups of
industries accounted for over 80 percent of the LBOs and going private
transactions (as measured by employment),
The total amount of research and development spending of the companies
involved in eleven years worth of LEO and other "going private" transactions
is 767 million dollars, a small fraction of the 40 billion dollar industrial
R&D budget in 1982. Even If this R&D were to be cut drastically, it wouldlava little icpsot on total R&D spending. i fact, although this R&D
disappeared from my aggregate statistics since rOe fineswentprivate (sod
cease to report tc the SEt) I rited evidence from Rapan (19891) sod
hichteobetg and Siegel (199Db) that most ci these fitms did out tedoce theit
spendiog gteatly as a tesult of the transaction in any case,
My results concerning the nontechnology intensive charactar of LBOs
and "going private" transactions is now supported by several other studies,
whichemploy samples involving many of the same firms although using
different methodologies. These studies have also demonstrated increased
operating efficiencies and reduced inestment after the buyout. The primary
study of interest is that by Lichtenberg and Siegel (199Db), whioc relies on
adifferent (confidential) source of data, the Census and Annual Surveys of
Manufacturing.Using a much larger sample than other studies, they found
that LEtshavehigher total factor productivity after the buyout then before
it and higher total factor productivity than other firms in their industry.
This was achieved by means of a substantial reduction in the nonproduction
worki roe (about 9 percent) while the ptoducticn wcrkforce declines very
slightly. The R&D of firms involved in b'xyouts was about 1 percent of sales,
whilethat fot the average large firm in the sample was 3.5 percent of
sales. The difference in R&D intensities between the two groups of
firmsbecomes slightly larger, but not significantly so, after the buyout.
ScrI. Kaplan (1989a, 198Db) and Smith (1989) report studies of large
MBCs during the early 198Ds; their samples are a subset of the 120a analyzed
by Lichtenberg and Siegel. These studies contain very similar findings:
there are substantial increases in profitability and cash flow post-huyout,
some cots n capital expenditures, and much of the gain to pre-buyout
shsreh"lders can be identified with tax savings. Both report that R&D is
8largely immaterial (7 firms report it in the Smith sample, 10-20 in the
Kaplan sample); for these firms there are slight reductions after the
buyout9
Turning to financial restructurings which do not involve changes in
control, the second finding in my 1990a study was that the most dramatic
results of restructuring were found in those transactions where a firm moves
to a substantially higher debt position; here the size of the average
decline in R&D intensity was about 0.8 percent of sales (from 3.4 percent to
2.6 percent) for the 1982 to 1987 period. These results are in contrast to
those for leveraged buyouts, since many of these firms were doing
significant amounts of R&D beforehand. The result was robust in the sense
that it appeared both in a conventional investment equation and in the pre-
and post-transaction differences in R&D intensity. To my knowledge, mine is
the only study, outside of a few case studies, to look specifically at large
financial restructurings which are not accompanied by a change of control.
The third finding in my 1990a study was less clear: there was mixed
evidence as to whether acquisitions in the publicly traded manufacturing
were followed by reductions in R&D intensity. Firms which made large
acquisitions experienced permanent (at least over the horizon for which it
can be measured) declines in their R&D intensity relative to their
pre-acquisition R&D intensity; the mix of firms making acquisitions
also shifted toward firms with lower R&D intensities during the eighties, so
that the combined effect was substantially lower R&D intensities relative to
9The result cited is not actually in the Kaplan papers, which I reference
because they describe the data on which the result is based. It was
communicated to me privately by Steven Kaplan; it is measure of the
unimportance of R&D in the large-scale MB0 sample that he didn't even
mention it in the reported results.
9the industry as a whole for posraoquisition urns i' the latter part of the
period. Although the statistical evidence fer decline was weak because
of the substantial heterugeneity in firmbehuvi.r, the size of the effect
was large in economic rerme, amounting 5c acne half cf one percent decline
in R&D intensity for chose firms engaged i R&D (chat is, frco an cverall
meanof 3.4percent to 2.9 percenr) for c}. 1982 cc 1987 period. This
declineturned out to be associsred wtrh the acquisiriors which were
accompaniedor financed by increases i' leverage; char is they were a
manifestation of the sane correlation between increases in leverage and
fallsin R&D intensity described previcudly.
Table 3 summarizes the evidence icon my earlicrpaper concerning R&D,
acquisitions,andincreases in leverage and includes new results for
ordinary investment for comparison. These new results demonstrate clearly
that the negative association between leverage and investment is not
confined to R&D investment. This table shows the results of a conventional
investment equation, estimated in levels and in a modified first-differenced
form (to control for permanent differences across firms).1D The table
ID . . -
Investmentequatrons nmsed on an accerecetor model of cnvestment usually
include a measure of current output ma a proxy for expectations of future
demand. Those based on the Q theory of investment with adjustment costs
include the ratio of the market value of the firm's assets to the book value
as s proxy for expectations of the profitability of the firm's capital
stock. The potential existence of liquidity constraints (external finance
having a higher cost than internal) also suggests a role for current cash
flow or sales in the equation, beyond that due to demand fluctuations. The
equation which I estimated is an eclectic combination of these differing
(although not inconsistent) schools of thought. Tne dependent variable is
measured as a ratio both for theoretical reasons (linear homogeneity of the
production function and adjustment cost function) and econometric reasons
(potential hetersskedaaticiry of the disturbances in the equation) .Inthe
first-differenced form of the equation, it is hypothesized that firms are
heterogeneous in investment rates in ways intrinsic to their technology and
unaccounted for by the model. For example, the R&D fnvestment rate in a
fast-moving electronics firm may be quite different in a permanent sense
from that of a firm in metal fabrication, If this fart is correlated with
19verifies the main findings described above: a large negative impact on both
kinds of investment from increases in leverage, and an insignificant
acquisition effect for R&D, once leverage changes are controlled for. What
is new is a slight hint of reductions in ordinary investment following an
acquisition which is not accounted for by the leverage variables; however
this effect is measured very imprecisely (note the large standard errors in
the investment equation), and seems to be somewhat sensitive to the
specification (compare the first-differenced results)
The magnitude of the implied association between leverage and
investment in Table 3 can be interpreted in the following way: suppose a
financial restructuring occurs which increases the long-term debt of the
firm by the size of the capital stock (LB/K1.0). In the year of this
event and the two years following, the total reduction in the
investment-capital ratio will be 0.05 (the sum of the three coefficients in
column 1 of Table 3) and in the R&D-capital ratio it will be 0,018. At the
mean levels of these variables (0.11 and 0.038 respectively) these are
enormous effects, implying reductions in the rate of investment of the order
of 50 percent. Note that the percentage reduction in both types of
variables in the regression (such as the market value-book value ratio), the
estimated coefficients of those variables will be biased. One possible
solution is to estimate the model
— +it (where Oy. —
ratherthan
yit — +it + Eit
where i indexes firms and t indexes years of data on each firm. o. is the
"permanent" firm investment rate, y is the rate of investment for firm i
in year t, and are the various independent variables.
11investment is rho sane (the elasticities arc tIc same, so there is no bias
toward rott:ng R&D rather than shorter-term irvestrent,
Beforeleaving this topic,I briefly sunnarize the results of other
researchersconcerning the aftermath of aoquisitions. Lirhtenberg and
Siegel (l990a) look at a very large sample of ownership changes at the
plantlevel, which include LBOs (abou' 13peroent of the sarple) and
acquisitions, both hostile and friendly. Central Office employment is
reduced by If perrent after charge, produotion employment by only 5
percent, leading ro substanrial inoreasee in Total Parrot Productivity
post-changeas in the LW) sample alone.Th important finding forpresent
purposesis that P&D employment growth is sustained ir, the face of
substantial reductions in ron-productic etrlcyment.
Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1989) look at the 50 largest mergers for
1979to 1983, and find that producti"ity improves, labor costs fall, and
investment and R&D rates are maintained; there are 33 R&D-performing firms
intheir sample. This work also documents the increase in leverage around
the time of the merger. but does not distcngnrsh. between hostile and
friendly acquisitions.
Unlikethe previous studies, the interesting study by Bhsgst,
Shleifer,and Vishny focuses on hostile takeovers, whether LBOs rt not,
They find that hostile takeovers ultimately end up allocating lines of
businesses to other firma in the industry, is other words, the raider is
actingas a temporary broker who assists the movement of assets into a
higher-valueduse. The shareholder gains from such activities are
accountedfor bythefollowing factors: 1) tax savings, although they
findthat previous results may be ar overestirare since the debt incurred
in these transartions tends to ho paid down quickly; 2) employment layoffs,
12particularly white collar: accounting for 11-26 perceot of the premium; 3)
in the oil: gas, and timber industries, cuts in investment seem to have
been an important source of gains: but they could not find evidence of
inveatment cuts in other industries.
3. Industrial Sectors.
One way we might be able to learn sooething shout the interaction
between corporate restructurogs and long- term investment is by exsminstion
of the differences scross industries which use different technologies. That
is, industries in the manufacturing sector vary in the length of time it
tskes to develop s new product or process in wsys which are intrinsic to
their technology and we csn make use of this fact to develop insights into
the chsnges in investment strategies induced by corporate restructuring. In
this section of the paper I exsmine two questions: first, in which
industries did substantial LEO end leveraging activity occur, end second,
how do the investment regressions presented in Table 2 vary across
industries. To do this, I divide the renufacruring sector into four groups
of industries, guided by the Chandler (1991) triage into high, stable, and
low technology sectors ond en informal assessment of those industries which
arelikely to have long horizons for project development, end those which
can move more quickly.
Theindustrial sectors are the following: 1) High technology consists
of Phermaceurirsis (excluding Soap, Toiletries, and Cosmetics), Computing
Equipment, Electrical Machinery, Electronics, Aircraft end Aerospace, end
Instruments. 2) Low technology is Food, Textiles, Lumber, Furniture, end
Paper, and Miscellaneous Manufacturing (which includes leather, toys,
musical instruments, etc.). The third end fourth groups consist ofChandler s stable tech--elegy sector plea the ron-pharmaceutical component of
the Chemicalindustry.1 incudethe latter in this group both because it
apcaart t elr'ngwit the Petroleum Refining industry, and because its R&D
spending patterns are closer tothestable technology than the high
technologyincuatries, Thus the final rwo groups of industries are 3)
Stable Long Horizon, which consists of Chemicals, Petroleun, Primary Metals,
fngines and Construction Equipment, Hon-electrical Machinery, and
Autrmcbilea (excluding rotor vehtcle parts); and L Stable Short Horizon,
which consists of Rubber and Plastics, Stone, Clay, and Class, Fabricated
Meals, Soap, Toiletries, and Ceecetirs, and Mtot "chicle Parts.
In Table 3. I show the distribution of Levetoged Suyouts and large
leverageincreases by these sectors, Thutemlts era very revealing:
First,relative to the size of the industry firms with stable short horizon
orlow technology ace fat more likely no undergo an LEO than the others.
this may be partly due to the fact that these firms are also slightly
smaller than those in the ether sector 'except fec some young firma in the
high technology sector). However, this fact is very supportive of the idea
that leveraged buyeuts requite a low variance in cash flow and investment
strategies in order to be profitable.
In addition to the 76 positively identIfied LEOs in my sample of firms,
there are 148 transactions in which a firm is taken private through means
which are net specifically identified in my seucces as leveraged buyouts.
These are generally smaller firms (they average 2800 employees pet firm, in
contrast to LSOa, which average 9600 employees per fine) and probably
115ee hall ,l491c) lottoredetail on data constnetton. The LEO sample
ccnsistc pnlt;tily uP these firms specifically identifieC by Kaplan (19BPs,
1989b) ne LeL: a"d Po'laen (3989) as leveraged buyouta.
14represent smaller transactions of the same type as an LEO. I show the
totals for these firms plus the LEOs (all going private transactions) in the
third panel of the table. They are clearly quite similar and only reinforce
the result: although only 36 percent of manufacturing employment is the
stable short horizon and low technology sectors, 83 percent of rhe
employment in firms which went private during the period is in rhese two
sectors. In addition, these firms are even less R&D-intensive than the LBDs
alone, For the U.S. manufacturing sector as a whole, R&D investment per
employee averages two thousand 1982 dollars; for rhe firms which were taken
private between 1977 and 1987, R&D investment per employee was five hundred
1982 dollars in the year or two before the transaction.
The second fact of interest is that stable long horIzon firms are
more than rwice as likely as firms in the other rhree sectors to undergo
huge leverage increases, g, unlike the other sectors, the firms for which
this occurs are almost as R&D-intensive as the crher firms in the sector.
This fact suggests that the pressure to restrucrure is not uniform across
sectors but is concentrated on sectors where icvesrmant is necessarily
long-term owing to its size or complexity, and where the technology is not
rapidly changing (in fact, rhe well-known "smokestack" industries).
Table 4 reinforces rhis view. It shows a simplified version of the
regressions presented in Table 2 for each of the four sectors and for the
manufacturing secrcr as a whole. The hypothesis that the coefficients are
rho same for all secrets is rejected at conventional levels of significance
(see the F-statistics shown in the table). A maser reason for rejection of
equality fur bcrh types of investment is the difference across sectors in
15lnvertnet 'rI-avior fllowing ircraaser in I n.--nge:" fires ir the tsb1e
techrr log; r c rs psrticulsr those nng bcriron rnA,r tries.
exoerierc -rgerdec15 ties in 5 nvests ent t5an fi-ns it the hish or low
tachro r gv rentersThe higher Ic ccl of fir err isl test-r'crirg a'-riviry it.
these re.' re is therefore rssociated 'J:t dcclinasSninves0ret wItch are
1r Icr ocr s-nol be predicted snlaly on the hens of the rantfaernting
c-no tot ae a w ole; in short, the psn-loverage inrestrant cuts seem to heve
ban psrriculsrly directed et the stable technolosy sector in general, cod
he longhorironsegment in per onlar
Or the other hann. t'-e o'erltnes in R&1 fa:l-nwing rrcreeses in 1eersge
sra nearly the same ptoporricnall-- and are lorra-nir '-I rs. sectorswhore
R&Dis rslstively larger shsre of In--°otment, I no ry-t thatpg'n
proxiesfor long term investment Sr appears that overeirsuchinvestment is
nor taking quite as big a hit as total invesrmen. I' is vary important ro
remember, however, that the outstanding chsracteristir of R&D spending
perrerns within the firm is their sb gishness bo the fare of any kind of
ohsnge: note the coefficient of Ispoc? RgD expendit-res -w.oichis nearly
ore,andexplains ninety percert of the variance in R&D expenditures across
t'rssall by itself. In view of this gonersl slowness to adjust, the
d' '-ltnes in R&D spending following ir noses in dah loom --cry large.
Lgltbooghrhe regressions could just es we:: be measuring increases in
investmer' following decresses in 1mg tore debt, the results will in fact
be dorinated by the consequerces of increased debt, since eighty percent of
theseurns experience an increase ir deb Sney givenyear. I checked the
resultby 'o' mating the regression wit0 dIfferent roefftcients allowed for
increases r-° decreases in long-term debt. ,.nd dthat the coefficients
were insignIficantly different frrr earh other, a; oh the ooefficien' for
investmont .o.nges fellowing increcses fn debt sbig ny Icrger in absolute
value.4, Case Studies.
-
Thecase study evidence, which consists of a few large transactions,
tends to support the findings of the large-scale empirical studies.3 Thete
are two major classes of transactions: the first is mergers between highiy
related latge firms, which are usually followed by no change or an increase
in R&D; the second consists of major increases in leverage or a leveraged
buyout induced by the threat of hostile takeover. These are generally
followed by cuts in R&D spending.
In the first group are several transactions in the petro-chemical
industry:1) CD. Searle was acquired by Monsanto in 1987, after which R&D
was supported at the previous level with more emphasis on basic research.
2) Celanese was taken over by Hoechst in 1987; this firm was more willing to
engage in long-term R&D. Although Hoechst is a foreign firm, the laboratory
in the United Stares remained fairly independent. 3) Stauffer Chemical was
taken over by Chesebrough-Ponds in 1985, This was followed by a hostile
takeover by Unilever in 1987; although the company was disbanded, the
previous level of R&D was apparently maintained in the remaining divisions.
4) Conoco was acquired by Dupont Chemical in 1982. After the scquisrion,
R&D for the parent firm increased in amount and as a percent of sales.
Outside the perro-chemical indusrry,the other main acquisitions in this
group are the Ceneral Electric acquisition of RCA in 1987 (the main R&D
laboratory, the Sarnoff Laboratory was donated to SRI, alrhouh CE
maintained s contract with the laboratory) ,andthe Phillip Morris
acquisition of Ceneral Foods in 1985, which was followed by a rebuilding of
1My primery sources for this evidence are Miller (199Ca, 199Db) and Fusfeld
(1987) plus testimony at a July 1989 Hearing of the Srience, Research, and
Technology Subsommitree of House Committee on Scenre, Space, and Technology
on Corporate Restructuring and R&D,
17P&D. These .cquisitirns are characterized by t air highly related nature;
theonly accuisirion in this group which was followed by unambiguous
reductions inh&t a the moat "crelared of then the merger of Signal (the
electronicraer space industry) with Allied Chemioal in 1985, This merger
was follova? y the disbandment of a new venture group and cuts in corporate
level R&D :tcugh overall R&D may not have dropped.
The acondgroup of rransartions leveraging or LEOasa defense
againsta rstile takeover, is dominated by transactions in the Rubber
Tirc anb lt.ne, Clay, and Class industries: 1) Owens-Corning-Fihemglass
increased its leverage in 1950 as a defense against a hostile takeover
mttarp : this was followed by a reduction in R&D and a general shrinkage of
the firm. 5) USC Corporation increased its leverage in 1987, again as a
takeover defense, and shortened its R&D horizon from 5-6 years to 3 yesms.
3) Cwens-Illinois undsnent an LED in 1987 to avoid a hostile takeover; efter
the LBC, R&D was emphasized more. &) Coodyear Tire and Rubber Co. wes
threatened by James Cddsmith in 1987; it restructured by ds-diversifiration
and leverage and rcc',ced R&D.5) Uniroyal Tire was threatened by Carl
lrahn in 1985- it responded by forming a joint venture with Coodrich to
develop tires, and cu' its own R&D spending as a result of this, but its R&D
Intensity was never hi1i. to begin with
There are two perro-chemical companies in this second group: the first
is Phillips Petroleum, which leveraged in 198 as a defense against a
hostiletakeower attempt by Boone Pickens. The firm madesubstantial cuts
in R&D personnel, although nor out of line with the shrinkage of the rest of
the firm. toort-tera payoffs were emphasized, although some analysts regard
the former Jr"el of R&D as wasteful, and view the Phillips case as a good
18example of the free cash flow theory at wotk.4 The second is Union
Carbide, which restructured in 1985 to reast a takeover by GAF Corporation.
As part of the restructuring they sold an R&D facility; but moved the R&D
into the divisions and did not reduce the intensity.
Finally we reach the only two cases in the case study litetature which
seem to represent high technology being threatened by hostile takeovers:
Datapoint and the best-known, Polaroid Corporation. The hostile takeover of
Datapoint by Asher Edelman in 1985 appears to have been a technology
disaster; since the customers desetted the fitm owing to a lack of
confidence in the longtun viability of its technology. R&D and investment
were cut by almost fifty petcent, but this is one case where increases in
leverage were not the cause; the firm has also remained in the publicly
traded sector. Because the firm was shtinking, the R&D intensity did not
fall much, and in 1987 Datapoint paid it first dividend. It is not clear
whether to interpret this as a successful shrinkage of an unprofitable
technology company or a failure to invest where there were good
opportunities.
In the case of Polaroid, aging technology and a high tate of R&D
expenditure with little apparent payoff made the firm vulnerable to hostile
takeover attempts. In 1986, leverage was increased as a defense, and R&D
intensity reduced slightly, although management claims that leverage was not
the reason for the reduction, It still is not clear whether the shift in
strategy has been successful.
In reading over the descriptions of these restructurings (except for
Datapoint and Polaroid), one is struck by several facts: first, the
14cites? e.g.,Jacobs.
19friardly cry r happened mainly bet-eon I i'ly related urns and were
aelcio'r I 11 wed by ruts in R&D invosroort. Second, the major roducrions in
P&D spendiro occurred when a firo war d-fcndirg against a hrstile taka'-ver
by iroreming its leverage. Third, the s.ajority of these evaorrrockplace
in a few ind"snnias not those nornslly thought of as high teoi'nr logy.In
fact, ihrlbn'asoars to be on what Chandler 'l99l calls 'stah.o
tachnoI.o" industries, and in particular, on tic cuhrct for whiol
teohnrlcgiral innovation is "process' oriented cr dirc tb toward cost
reduction rather than prodnrt development. This ia no" lbcly the area wi etc
one expects the strongest or -cI etition from foreign flb r vcth l'wer coss,
and one cannot help tI inking that the reason the p' s"rr tr restructure has
been dirroted towards these industries has soosthing to do with
over investment.
When taken together with the atatistroal evidence of the previous
section,the case study evidence is very suggestive. It appears that the
moat negative avert for investment is the defense of a hostile takeover,
which is usuali.v r"oompanied by a debt for equity swap. Takeovers as a
whole are frequenthy friendly, between firma in highly related
industries, and not followed by inveatmen" outs. The case study evidence is
alsoconsistent with the industrial srtor level results presented earlier:
the market for corporate control and the pro. sures for reduced investment
are centered on the stable technology sac t r, 'articularlyon those
1'5Note that the oaae atudy evidence ignores a few industries, in particular
Food and Textiles, where substantial restruoturings lava occurred. ThIs is
because the focus of this evidence was the questr'n ofR&Dinvestment, and
littleis done in those industries. What is in"rrratinlisthe fact that
even when we focus on R&D-performing firms, the oas rtudias are do'sinated
by firms in medium or stable technology induatrieo ran "r than high
technology
20industries which are viewed as having "long horizon" technologies.
It is clear that, at least for this sector, the raiders' view that the
previous investment strategies were misdirected and excessive was shared by
the capital markets (were this not true, the hostile bid would not have been
large enough to succeed in changing the firm's strategy). In this, they are
much like the l.BOs and M6Os documented by Kaplan (1989a, 1989b) and Smith
(1989), Unfortunately, unless one is s doctrinaire believer in efficient
markets, this evidence is not enough to persuade one that all the
investments foregone were unprofitable. "The path not taken" is difficult
to evaluate.
The finding of reduced investment following leverage increases or
takeover threats is also consistent with two other pieces of evidence which
attempt to evaluate the frequently heard statement that the negative impact
of mergers and acquisitions extends to firms which ate not involved in them
(via a kind of demonstration effect).
Ashmute (1990) studied the behavior of 37 potential targets (identified
by a financial analyst who published the candidates in Grimm's) relative to
a control group of firms who were not targets. He found that the targets
reduced their R&D and investment to sales ratios, and increased their debt
in the year following identification by Grimm's. The total effects were
shout 1.6 percent (s fall from 4 to 2.4 percent) in the R&D-sales tstio and
2.0 percent in the investment-sales ratio. It is not clear from his work
whether the larger increases in debt of the potential targets are a
combination of many firms with no change and a few with large changes from
resttuctucings.
In a study which examines the effectiveness of shark repellents as a
test of Stein's (1988) model of managerial myopia, Muelbroek g al (1990)
21find fit's. decocese 1t&D intensity telani e t n1urtty ROt intensity
followirg.e passage of an aroitekeover .,d, ant 203firms;If ncn-mfg)
This findin r& cots the tecrecirst prop ci cion that the cxi ster cc of
ptoteotion from takamver will ftee mate gets to make loog 'erm investments
alrhoughcugge ste that the redccf 'n in POP investment was patt of a
general p çfe of takeover defenses wnioh ma: include levetage iroreases
If it wm. pirtof an antitakeover strategy, we would expect to see no
change itL PIP i ohaviot undet tnull hypothesis. Unfortunately they do
rot ask w' ether the leverage ne. firm increased or the same time so we
.annoP r11 wocncr thio reout it coreletely oonristnt with mine or
5. Discuss' r.
The striking feature of the evidonce on mestruoturings during the
lPfOs is its oonsirtenoy, in sp5re of the obvious fa'"that every firm's
situation is "special" and thee we -apectsubstantial divergence in the
results from cccl, transaction. I hoC ic've it is now pornible to draw a few
simple concusis from the accuoruln'e" evidence. The first is that
changes in crnrcl rcur for a wide yen' -ofrcasrns, and there it no
obvious asacciat4"n berwean the vest ma'oriny of them an" long-term
inveatmert strategies. At least in manufacturing, many of them appear to be
driven by synargies and relatedness between acq siring end acquired firma.
Whether hostile or friendly they are freenertly efficiency-enhancing at
least in the shots-term, in the sense that productivity increases, coats
fell and profItability rises following the trar:cctoon. They do not
ohoessaril lead to cuts in investment strategies of any kfnd, although they
22may involve some needed redirection
Particularly in the case of hostile
takeovers the evidence
suggests
mismanagement of assets, excessive
diversification andpossiblyan
inability or unwillingness of the
existing management to break impLicitor
explicit contracts with labor




ones, the driving force issimply thatthe
sum is worth more than the
parts. Here I would citemy Oresultson
mergers (Hall l988a and 1990b),
Lichtenberg and Siegel onoershjp changes,
Bhagat, Shlejfer and Vishny
on hostile takeovers and
many others.
On the other hand, massive
changes in financial structure
Possibly
induced by threats of takeover
do appear to be
accompanied by reduced
investment of all kinds; this
is documented both in
my regressjo0 results
and by several case studies.
This fact also holds for
financial
restructuring5 accompanied by controlchanges (such as L.BOm andMOs), but in this case the extreme
nature of the transaction
mitigates against it
being used in industries where
long-term investments in innovationare
appropriate
Although this relationship between
increased debt levels andreduced
investment exists for all
industries, it is Particularly
Strong in what
Chandler calls the "Stable
Technology sector and the Petro_chemical
industry. In fact, the major hostil5
takeover events in
manufacturing have
taken place Primarily inonly a few industries: Petro.chemical
Rubber, and
Stone, Clay, and Glass. The
cost-based nature of innovation
strategies in
these industries suggest that
increased foreign competitionfrom lower cost
producers has been the driving force
behind this wave and lendssupport to
23Jensen' a icash flow theory in' r roeaoioof tea' ruoturing,
(Th.y race these large(note sesItd to- —cuity ration nrc'trtedin many
eaoufatu C g firnr? One pcssba ensae'to this quesrirn hasbeen
we1isumoar' red by Blair (99(.drawiop
or, work by Blair andLiten (19901:
tax ircen.i'(debt is a theper rcur"eof finar.ca than equity)and the
aganoy crc 'associatedwith re cash flow have alwaysmade it attractive
to aubstour' debt for equity.
rarticulsrlv when invertors facebetter
inveatr'--opportanitiea "han nhfirms whose shares they own.Financial
inn"'vatic(e.g. junk
bands during the 198Cc madethis substitution
easIer an the Tax Reforo
dot of 1981 made it toreedventageous:C? however,
at:O5' s"be. origin of theseinnovationo unexplained. Why
did obey arise
Cur-0'-he eigrties and not before?Blair st7wa that froe 1980onward the
net re"irr. en capitalin manufacturing has fallenbelow the real cost
(measuredby bond returns),after being eubs'entielly
above it for thirty
years prict. ticis a clear signal that
cash within the manufacturing
sector should -returnedto shareholders rather
than invested, and she
arguea thot ic toan increased pressure
for financicl restructuring
in
order to tie oc'.agrs' hands
by forcing them to facethe reel (externel)
cost of capita] rather
than the artificially low
(iorernel) cost.
Thinergo—an" indies thatthe financial restructurings
which we
L6tnthecase nfthe petrole-wo refining industry,
there iS another fector:
much of the inveonnent activityin this industry, particularly
R&D
investment, is related tothe exploraticn cod developmentof oil reserves
tether than ranufarturing
activities. There is some reasonto think of this
as a special casedriven by the expectations
of future world oil prices;we
may believe thatthe s"cial return (at anational level) to this typeof
investment is higher thanthe private return, but not
necessarily for the
same reasons as the rest0hemanufacturing sector.
"1See Sobippec and Snith '118pend Schnles and Wolfeon(2990) fcc a
discussion of the chenga. in
relative tax cetee on debtand equity in the
IsBI and 1986 Tax Befcco Oo"oand t(eic effect on leveragedbuyont eotivity.
2'ohaerve and the investment reductions associated
with theo, ate hoth
sysproms of an underlying cause: high real interest rates The onlprit is
not the restructuting
g, but the shift in rela: iea pticee wI i.J. eee-!
it.Although we may find isolated cases of thea parent eliminatIon of
profitable investment strategies, for the mostpar those which have
disappeated do not have a high enough expected
prufitability in the current
- . 13 economic envrronjsent
This is a persuasive argument and
many economists agree with its
essential points (cites this volume?, Winter 1991), butit raises
intetesting questions and suggests further avenues for
research. First, why
did the net return to capital in
manufacturing start falling? Is it solely
because of increased foreign competition? Orhas a failure to invest in the
pesr driven it lower? Second, perhaps the increased
cost of capital alone
can account for a shift toward restructuring end
away from investment in
some industries, without appealing to a simultaneousfell in the expected
terorn to investment (or marginal product ofcapital).
Taken together with the cost of capital
story, my findings that
restructuring pressures and reduced investment 5t8 concentrated
in certaIn
industries, in particular those with stable technologies,
suggest rh0r
further research should be directed at thequestion of whether toe
cost of capital or expected return to investment inthese industries can
help explain why they have experienced greaterpressure. Blair ar,d Sohary
(1991) have begun research on this question, but theirresults etc still
preliminary.
18The cost of capital is
addressed in more derail by several authors in this
volume (Molkiel, Fearer and Luhrman,-- .). Alsosee McCauley end Zimmer (1989) for a more derailed discussion of the impactof the cost of capital
on long-term investments.
25Before leaiil ca.s tnpi:'ot Sc?" tt"t. engnaslseagain a
question whiil the sisteng evidstc'e ices act a"swet ,,5Froot,Fetold, and
S'rin this volume' highligot, a roict arsane" 'in the underi"vastnent
dbate is tt asyratrismicros ticu between managers and shareholders
reds tcnod'tinvestaent in ords" "'c higher current earnings. This
argument is flasely linked to the hostile takeover de'nate: asI haveargued
inHall lcb' ,ifthe ncrket is myopic in this way takeovers will be
induted which wcnld notvelue.oawiriring in a perfect infcaticn world,
ard in addition itvestr:ert may he reduced or redirected to prevent
taketvet". This can cc.ur "er :n til absen"e "f managerial yctia.and is
in fst the princi7al atgute.nt for a pulicy response to increasesin hce"ile
takeover s'tivity.
Thedifficultytempiricalresearchers who use publicly available
datato investigate this hypothesis: is chat the "information gap"between
managers end sharehc data is surely only a. .ctge asthe degree of
undistlusadmica::' ta,. thatis. t5ui'nm mcntmeasures easily available
tous arc ptecisci at 'se for wntch. 'pan b" ncnt will beunable to conceal
from investors redu luco tuat are :'ndmna,,kan "a increase current earnings.
Therefore.., our con-ca a. c' mId be vi" r 'directions of investmenttoward
shorter horirca s,-.nc mtl acs with so i: things at sk" mping onmaintenance or
canceling long "'at, 1 hD p"" acts. hut these are preciselythe kind of
behavior which ny be difficult f. t ut 5.5teseartheta,to see, The
implication of i is argus'ent is that while the failure tofind
substantial invec"nert and lIRE declines in general following cn':potate
ra structuring activity end th° wall.dccumsnted positiveannouncenent effects
fat both kinds of mnveatcant te.p., 'Joniridge 1988) may be teassuting,it
will be necessary to look mare clcsniywi"hin specific firmsbefore
26definitively rejectfng this particular market myupia argument.
6. International Comoarisons.
Wehave leatned some important iacts about the effects and rocivat t
of resrructurings from the research reported here and elsewhere. The
results have more often been positive than negative for the firms involved,
andhave frequently confirmed the hypotheses of those who argue. that the
marketfor corporate control is an important discplino device for managers
in the United States. However, the survey of the evidence in sections 2
through 4 of this paper baa had very little to say about the econoxyvide
effects of the recent wave of restructurings. That is, even if the
redirection of firm strategies and investment has been profitable for the
firms involved, we are still not sure whether there might be a better paeh
tolong term productivity gains.
Thus, the discussion n the previous section does not imply that we
shouldbe sanguine about our current economic structure and its promotion ci
long- term investment; besides the obvious macco-economic problems which
have led to high interest rates and the inherent, subsidy of debtte lativete
equity in our tax sys ten., it is conceivable that the atmosphere of
insecurity which attends the market fur corporate control in thta cnuntey
has a more negative effect on long- term investment strategiea than has heen
found in the studIes to dote.
In any came, even if we do not believe that the recent wave of
corporate restructuring has been rhoe of investment declines, t,e.rc
remains the question of whother out market system for corporate control is
capable of generating the correct level of long-term investment from the19
poirtof view of society as a wnole.The existence cf an ac' [we market for
corporatecontrolwhich wastrue well hefore 1981 ray already have created
a climate whore such irvestacuts are diacouragcd urnut valued.'This
argumentleads me to nvesriga te the experience of other loegcindusrial
oconomies
In this section of rho paper, I look briefly at the organization of the
corker for corporate control in several other countries (Japan, Cerrany,
France, and the U K,) in order to evaluate alternative systems icr achievtng
t:,egoalof a profitable and productive industry Roughly speaking, chase
countries (including the United States) can he divided into wo groups: the
US,and the U.F. ,wheretakeovers perform a major funcicu n the
allocation of corporate control: end Japan, Germany, and France, wherc
management discipline is not perceived as a major role of the stock marker
A simple way to characterize the difference between the two systems
uses Hirschman'a (gfl)exit/voicedichotomy: in the U.S. and U.K.
shareholders who are dissatisfied with management's performance tend o sell
their shares, often to a higher bidder who may change the management team or
otherwise reorganize. That is, the shareholders "exit" when things dr'n't go
the way they want. In the Japan and German systems, and to a lesser extent.
the French, there are major shareholders (particularly banks and, in Japan,
other firms in long term relationships with the firm in questor) who tend
191n this connection, aee the recent paper by Foley and Lezoniok (1999),
which uses an endogenous growth model (a model where innovation sp1ls over
to other firms) together with market miapricing of innovative firms to show
that lower costs of takeover can lead to an equilibrium growth rate for
labor productivity which is lower than the one which would be assooiaed
with higher takeover coats.
see the discussion in Hall (l990a), which cites Grilichea (1951),
Gookburn and Griliches (1987), Hall (1988b), Jarrell, hahn, and Mart
(1985),ond Woolridge (1988) for evidence that at least the stock market
appears to value R&D investments positively.
28to hold their shares for a long time, have seats on the aupervisory boards,
and use "voice' when they feel chat the management of the fira ia not
putsuing the right atrategy, ot when the fita ia in financial disttess.
The evidence for thia diatinction ia in Edwards and Fischer (1991)
Edwards and Eisenbeis (1991), Franks and Mayer (1990), Kearer (1991), Mayer
and Alexander (1990), and Hoahi, Kashyap, and Scharfatein (1990). For
example, although the level of takeovers appeara to be almoar as high in
Germany and France as in the UK, the incidence of hostile takeovers (which
are generally more likely to be a form of management diacipline) is much
lower, as is the incidence of 1.aos.21 Franks and Mayer attribute this bcrh
to the fact that the regulations concerning the employment of msnsgemenr snd
others are stricter in Germany and to the fact that shareholders rights seem
to be somewhat less in both France and Germany.
Franks and Mayer also cite substantial institutional differences
between the three countries, centering on the role of banks in Germany or
monitoring orgsnimsrions. Banks have significant shareholdings in other
corporations, also hsve voting rights associated with the bearer shares of
private investors, and they sit on the supervisory boards of
Akreinzesellschsfts (German corporations or AGs for short) .Thisrole for
banks in the monitoring of firm behavior is paralleled in Japan, according
to several writers (Hodder 1955, Hoshi, Ksshyap, and Schsrfstsin 1990).
The conclusion which Franks and Moyer draw from their study is thor the
21The U.K. has experienced the same explosive growth in LEG activity as the
United States, with the total annual value of transactions rising from less
than 100 million pounds before 1980 to 3.7 billion pounds in 1988. This
tremendous growth has been achieved with a somewhat lower use of debt than
in the United States. The timing of the increase raises interesting
questions shout the tax motivation story for bROs since the U.K. has nor
experienced changes in the tax low at the same time as the U.S.
29use of takeovers as a means of tranaferrit g crporate control may be costly.
both in the resources used et the time of takeover and in the scorrrerr
thinking which they claim it engendersThey also argue that cbrsea ir
owtership undermine the ability of firms to sustain a reputation for
1mg-term relationships." Alternative institutions for monitoring tie
investment strategies of firms may he preferred to the conrincove uc on
impliedby the takeover market because they are less costly with rerecr to
the development of long-tero relationships and investments.
This conclusion is supported somewhat by the results in Fe' hi, Mae,
and Scharfsrein (19ff, 1990), who show that investment ct th f'rm loyal in
Japan is resprrs'vm to liquidity (crab flow) wlco the f5rr J a not ha e
longrunbanking relationship or does not belong to a t1ru,but not
otherwise. They interpret this to mean that banks with large shareholdngs
in firms are capable of monitoring them more closely than onrsde investors
and that this mitigates the asymmetric information problem that crises when
firma seek external finance, They support this with a finding that firms in
keireraus ar with strong ties to a main bank invest and sell more than orer
firms when they are in a financially distressed stare.
It is important to realfze that although Japan end Germany hcve in
common the absence of a strong market for corporate control, the nature of
the relationships between firms and their banks seem to be somewhat
different, Edwards and Fischer (1991) doc'erenr the apparent weakness of the
supervisory role which banks play for large German firma: although they
hold proxy rights for roughly half the shares in the 100 major AGe the
supervisory board typically meets only twice a year, and the banks have only
10-20 percent of the seats on the board, in addition, unlike Japan, barks
era not a major source of finance for firms; Mayer (1990) reports the
30following shares of bank lending in the net financing of nonfinanoial
enterprises 1970-1985: UK 7g. Germany 121, US 24.2, France 37.3, and Japan
5Q422 There the German banks appear to be most important is in the lending
to and monitoring of small and medium-aired firma (Mayer and Alexander
1990) .Themoat important feature of the system may not be the actual
monitoring performed by the banks, but the institutional features (for
example, employee representatives have 50 percent of the seats on the
supervisory boards, removal of the supetvisory board requires approval of 75
percent of the shareholders, and managers are appointed for five year terms)
of the German system, which tend to make hostile takeovers difficult (and
veryuncommon)
Itwould be quite interesting to repeat the Hoshi, Kashyap, and
Scharfstein teat of differences in liquidity constraints with data on German
firms; although the keiretau institution does not exist in Germany,
variation in the extent of bank'nvo1vement on the supenisory boards of
firms does (Edwards and Fischer 1991). 1 am unaware of any current research
of this kind, although there has been similar work on the U.S. and U.K. ara
which attempts to measure the importance of liquidry constraints for
investment at the firm level by olasaffying firma into financing regimes
based on their dividend and new share issue policies (Hall 1991 for the
U.S., Bond and Meghir 1990 for the U.K.). Although both sets of authors
have rejected investment models which do not incorporate liquidity
constraints with their data, this work is still too preliminary and fragile
22Mayer (1990), Table 12.1. I have reproduced some of these figures in
Table S of this paper, along with some of my own for U.S. and Japanese
manufacturing. Hat financing is shown as a proportion of capital
expendituresand stock building. The data are from the GEGO Financial
Statistics and have been adjusted to make them as coeparoble as possible.
31to be relied on.
In spite of the well-dcoumentcd diffcrercre in ti,e role of books in
monitoringfirm behavior across differen" ne"Lnal institutional atrurtur
the moat etriking feature of these irtornational oomparison studies La toe
importanceof retained earnings as aaouroeof finanoe for invesment, and
the rolative unimportanoe of Thng'term bonds (exoept in the U.S. nere a
third of the debt ie honda). to Table 3, I have assembled sore nua'tera
(herb from my own data cod from those of other researchers) which desori're
"he marginal sources of finance in four countries for the nonfinanclal
oorprrate seotor as a whole, and for the approximately 100 largest
msn'faoturinq firra in eaoh o"urtry.
My st"erp"" cn—o'te these numbers for Japan and the United States
revealed that no-'comparabiliry in a000unting methods across oountniee may
render this kind of comperison extremely difficult to perform. For example,
I am unable to determine gross debt and equity changes from the Japanese
data available to me, which does not identify a full statement of charge in
financial position In the U. S. data for most firms, the net sources and
uses of funds are not equal to rero, even approximately which meats there
aresome sources or uses overlooked in the data. Also in the United Statce,
a large fraction of net finsnce does not cove from any of the conventLonal
sources, bun roves from the net sale c invstoent and plant and equipment,
as well as fror the "other' category cf rho sources of funds, This fraction
has increased between the seventies and the eighties, another symptom of the
restructuring and divestitures which have taken place.
Besides the importance of retained earnings in all countries, the
second feature which stands out in Table 5 is tha" for the non-financial
corporate sector as a whole, the pattern of financing In the U.S. looks morelike Japan than the U.K.: the United States and Japan rely far mete heavily
on debt then do the U.K. and Germany. If true, the faot that average
incremental financing prcportions do not reveal a dichotomy between the U.S.
and U.K. on the one hend, and Jepen and Germany on the other suggests that
the story is not a simple one: were it simply the case that U.S. firms
could not finance investment externally, we would expect the financing
proportions to differ, but in fact, the U.S. looks more like Japan, except
that a larger proportion comes from new equity rather than new debt.2 For
differences, we must lock to the uses of funds, rather then the sources.
Here i em hampered by the incompleteness of the Japanese date, although the
German date does suggest that fcc less of the money goes to finance
acquisitions then in the U.Kjhayer and Alexender 1990).
To sum up, the international evidence in this section, although
incomplete, puts us back where we started: there is s strong feeling that
long- term investment strategies are difficult to implement in an environment
where managers fear losing their jobs or firms if they experience bad draws
for a couple of years, but little hard evidence, The primary evidence that
there is a better way is Japan, but it does not seem realistic to argue that
if shareholders rights were reduced in the United States without changing
anything else that this would have a significant effect ott investment
strategies. There are surely other reasons why Japan is different.
23 . . . Anotherplace of evrdence on thrs question Is the payout ratio, the
fraction of rerodivdend operating income which is paid out as dividends
Hayerend Alexander report that this number averages 13 percent for large
German non-financial corporations and 31 percent for the U.K. In my U.S.
sample, the number is almost exactly the same as Germany's.
337 fje; lications and Foture fgsearrt
The evidence assembled bere tells us that if corporate restruc:'rIub
discourages investment,itdces so by iecreesirrp tbe cost cf fundr :c r,fir
in order tc force eansgers to pay out cash, sod not by e ctsrpe f conuill
alone. That ts, to the extent we ace able to judge fror the observaile
investmentstrategies, many restructurings inthe U. S. rornufarcrrngso tcr
in the last ten years have had no impact on investment atrategioc while sore,
particularly in the stable technology sector, have ci early been induced by a
twin desire to use a cheaper source of finance (debt) ar,d reduce iresc.€rt
sectors which have become unprofitable ir' the face of high cepttsl cm
Such sn sctioni5 rrivstelyrstional in a world with high interest rres end o
subsidy of debt rel,llv to equity. The question remains, is ft roctsi1y
rsrionsl Are there politically acceptable (fessible) policies which would
inhibit such behavior?
T do not believe that the evidenoe on investment horizons snd corporate
restruoturing implies or justifies speoifio strong policy reoommendstions.
The market for corporate control is an important msnagement discipli'k' d'v',ce
and the reduction of shareholder rights by antitskeover legislstion widen
the substitution of mn alternative supervisory mechanism would be likely m
allow firms to diverge even further from the private (or public)
value-ssxirizlng path. It does not seem believable thst managers, as r
are more likely toinoorporstethe social welfare funotion in their cIsc-org
thsn ahsr1rolders. To put it another way, although it may be the case that
the Jap-nose or German system of oorporate governance results in longer
investment horirona, I do not think that halfway messurea or partial movesin
that direction would be successful in producing suct o result, a-rd a whoisssle
installation of the entire bank monitoring end fnterlcrking corporate oyster
34in the United States is simply not feasible fot complex histoticel, legal end
political reasons, The one institutional change that might succeed is a
relsxetion of the testtictions on shateholdings by banks (see Edwatds and
Eisenbeis, this volume).
On the othet hand, this paper (end othets) have pointed to two features
of the U.S. economy which seem to have increased the incentives to increase
leverage and reduce investment in the recent past: the implicit subsidy in
the corporate tax system towards debt finance, end the level of interest rates
(or the cost of capital) during the nineteen-eighties. I think thet both the
modern theory of corporate capital structure and the evidence here suggest
thet the tax effect will tilt the firm toward the use of more expensive
external finance for investment, end the interest rate effect will cut both
the level and the horizon of that investment. Policies which change these
orices, tether then institutional structures, ere mote likely to succeed in
lengthening investment horizons. It is not that institutional structures are
unimportant, but they etc extremely diffcuit to modify in ways whose results
ste predictable, end without incurring substantial transactions costs. In any
case, therm is evidence that the Japanese and Oerman systems of corporate
finance and governance are moving towards ones that look more like outs
(Kester 1991, Hoshi, Keshyap, end Scherfsten 1988, Hodder 1985), which
suggests that some sort of hybrid system is better, at least on evolutionary
grounds.
There are several areas in which future research on this topic should he
conducted, end questions which should be probed more thoroughly. With the
existing date, it should be possible to refine the investigation of major
leveraging
35events, now that these have been dentiiU? as associated wi& the aajorit
of investment declines: first, the iden'ifiraticr of such everos and 1e
causes(such as takeover threats) ofemould be greatly rnprcve
Second, the consequences of the red.zctions in fnvastnent or other
redirections ought to be examined over a lorger term than has beer d'ne o
date; we now should have evaileb] e over five years of data for
restruotorings during the 1984-1986 period.
A second area of investigacion centers on the results in Tablesand 4
of this paper, which call for a more detailed industry-level investigation
of certain sectors which seem o have experienced °he most presa':rc. from
restructuring does the cost of capital approach xplain what ha-pe-.er ir
these se-tots? Are the surviving firms strorger and what has ]apted to
their investment strategies? To the extent posstble this reseerch should
alsoaddress the "unobservable investment" question in more detail.
Finally, I think the empirical evidence on international comparisons
has barely scratched the surface of the question to date. Neither tie
sources and uses of funds comparisons, which seem to suffer from aevere
measuretent difficulties nor the role of banks in monitoring firms (ortprra
the conclusions in Franks and Mayer 1990 with those in Edwards and Fisccec
1991 concerning the role of banks in Germany) seem to be completely
understood. With the exception of Noshi, Kashyap, and Scharfatein on Japac.
little has neen done to relate this work to investment strategies aoroas
companies at the level of the individual firm, Further work of this kind




CORPORATERESTRUCTURING IN THE PUBLICLY TRAGE MANUFACTURING SECTOR
Total Employment (l000s) in
Employment Public Foreign Private
Year (l000s) Acquisitions L&OsLeveraging
77 20917. 66.0 1.3 10.4 0.6 30.7
76 21169. 191.8 46.9 17.9 0.0 22.5
79 21999. 311.3 11.9 15.5 1.3 58.7
80 21284. 152.8 24.8 1.6 13.6 150.4
81 20880. 310.0 15.6 42.4 19.4 142.6
82 19806. 186.2 38.3 49.6 35.2 256.0
83 20138. 298.0 0.0 14.9 33.1 33.9
84 20034. 188.0 2.2 104.7 93.5 73.6
85 19279. 382,7 111.4 52.1 132.9 146,9
86 18526. 656.3 190.5 84.1 172.6 116,1,
87 17898. 179.9 201,4 63.9 226.2 113.5
Total 2924.3 644.4 457.0 128.9 1144.9
Average size
(l000s employees) 6,6 7.6 2.6 9.6 6.5
*
Thesample isallfirms on Standard and Poor a Compustat Primary,
Secondary, Tertiary Industrial, and Over-the-Counter Files for 1976 through
1987 whose SIC code is between 2000 and 3999.
**
Leveragingfirms are those whose increase in long-term debt in any one
year was greater than 100% of the sum of their debt and equity at the











Ordinary Investment R&D Investment
t(R/K)
-.094 (.008)

























Leverage Changes for All Firms
-5.55 (.38) -10.42 (.39) -1.71 (.08)
-.29 (.39) -7.63 (.44) -.16 (.09)
.90 (.36) -.76 (.38) .12 (.09)
Leverage Changes for Acquiring Firma Post-Acquisition
Intercept -.33 (.36) -1.86 (.38) -.06(.09)
(48/K) -2.18 (1,02) 1,54 (1.09) .18 (.24)
(88/K) -1.33 (1.07) 0.91 (1.14) -.04 (.25)
(85/K) -2.62 (1.33) 1.10 (1.45) .05 (.32)
F-star (414200)
for acq. effects 9.01 6.00 0.40
Standard error 8.35 8.93 1.99
4.42
1.98
See the next page for nores and a description of the variables,
38TABLE 2, continued.
All regressions include year dusssies. The dependent variahle is measured
in percent (100 times the investment to capital stock ratio) The numbers
in poreotheses are the standard errors of the estimated coefficients.
Varjhj Definitions:
I -- Capitalexpenditures for the firm during the year.
R -- R&Dexpenditures for the firm during the year, set to zero if
immaterial
S -- Salesfor the firm during the year.
V --Marketvalue of the firm (debt plus equity). V/K is Tobin's Q.
B-- Longterm debt of the firm, adjusted for the effects of inflation
as described in Hall (199Cc).
All ratio variables have been trimmed to remove obvious coding errors. The
cutoffs used are approximately +/- three times the interquartile range of


































LEVERAGING EVENTS IN MANUFACTURING BY
l977"1987
INDUSTRY TYPE
























































8.6 2.0 2.1 4,5
The notes to the table are on the following page.
40TABLE 3 (continued>
*
Thedivrsion of the manufacturing sector into High, Stable, and Low Tech
sectots follows the definitions of Chandler (this volume>. Using my (Hall
1990a> toughly two-digit classification, the sectors ate the following:
High Tech: Pharmaceuticals (except Soap and Toiletries>, Elec.
Equipment, Electronics, Computing Equipment,
Aircrafr end Aerospace, Instruments.
Stable (Long Hot.>: Chemicals, Petroleum, Primary Metals, Machinery,
Autos and Transport Equipment (except parts>, Engines.
Stable (Short Hor.>: Eubber and Plastics, Stone, Clay, snd Class,
Fabricated Metals, Soap and Toiletries, Motor Vehicle
Parts.
Low Tech: Food, Textiles, Lumber end Wood Products, and Misc.
** . Theseare leveraged buyouts plus approximatery ISO transactions where a
firm was taken private without being identified in the data sources
specifically as a leveraged transaction. These are generally smaller
firms.
A leverage increase occurs when a firm increases its long-term debt in a
single year by an amount which is 100percentor more of the beginning of
year sum of debt plus equity.
41TABLE 4
INVESTMENT REGRESSIONS BY INDUSTRIAL SECTOR
1977-1987
sectors are defined in thenotesto Table 3,
**Th variables are defined in the notes to Table 2.
The last row in each panel of thetablegives the percent reduction in
investment which is predicted to occur in the year following a three year
increase inthedebt o capital ratio which is three standard deviations
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SOURCES OF INVESTMENT FINANCING
United StatesUnited Kingdom Japan West Germany
GrossSources:Non-Financial Corporate Sector
Period * 70-85 70-85 70-85 70-85
Ret, earn. 56.9 72.0 33,7 55,2
New debt 41.2 25.0 62.1 24.0
New equity 0.8 4.9 3.5 2.1
Other -8.8 -2.0 0,7 18.6
Sources: 2fljflanca Corporate Sector
Period 70-85 70-85 70-85 70-85
Ret, earn. 85.9 102.4 57.9 70.9
New debt 34,6 5,4 41.3 9.0
New equity 1.1 -3.3 4,6 0.6
Other -21.5 -4.4 -3.8 19.4
GrossSources:kgest1Q.Q
Period 82-87 82-88 82-88
Ret, earn, 51.5 58.2 89.6
New debt 30.2 27.5 2.2
New equity 10.1 14.3 8.2
Other 8.1 NA. NA.
**
Sources: 3ggt 100 Firms
Period 82-87 82-88 82-86 82-88
Ret, earn. 79.1 112.9 50,9 137.9
New debt 3.2 -1.6 19.0 -27.8
New equity 3.1 -11.3 30,0 -10.2
Other 14.6 NA. NA. NA.
Notes:
*The definitions of the variables and the sources of the data are given
in the Appendix. The variables definitions vary somewhat across different
countries because of different accounting conventions. All variables are
shown as percentages of the total in any given coluimn.
**Inthe U.S. and Japanese data, these are the (approximatey) 100 largest
manufacturing firms. For the U.K. and German data, these are the 100
largest nonfinancial corporations.
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